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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past decade, several financial and economic crises hit a number of developing
countries. While some of these crises appeared to be isolated incidents affecting
one country, for example, in Turkey and Argentina, a far greater number of them
had effects beyond the borders of the initial country. In particular, the European
Monetary System crisis of 1992, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the East Asian crisis of
1997, and the Russian crisis of 1998 affected more than the initial country.
The volatile nature of these crises resulted in economic hardship, political in-
stability, and the toppling of a few governments. What made the crises even more
disturbing was how they spread from country to country in an unexplained manner.
The real difficulties associated with these financial crises prompted calls for the im-
plementation of a variety of remedies from capital controls and currency boards to
restrictions in the flow of foreign direct investment.
1.1 Problem Statement
This thesis develops a discrete-time stochastic model of the spread of a financial crisis
from one country to another. The model for such contagion of financial crises is used
to explore the paths a crisis can take through different countries. The thesis aims to
make contributions in the following areas:
Markov Chains: To present a novel scheme of modelling financial crisis through
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Markov chains in which each Markov state is a state of the world with some
countries in a tranquil financial condition and some in crisis.
Mathematical Programming: To outline an optimization model in a mathemat-
ical programming paradigm. This can be used to generate a set of transition
probabilities between the Markov states that are in line with empirical data on
crisis probabilities and beliefs about contagion mechanisms.
Contagion Channels: The model developed allows for comparison of various chan-
nels of contagion. For instance, crisis probabilities can be computed using bi-
lateral trade data, credit or investment data. The results obtained can then
be compared to assess the relative efficacy of the two channels in explaining
contagion.
1.2 Thesis Overview
The next chapter, chapter 2, reviews the existing literature on the notion of contagion
and approaches to modeling crises. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the Markov chain
framework and the optimization program. Chapter ?? describes one instance of the
model. Chapter 5 shows the application of the model to historical data.
12
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Types of Contagion
There are several related but distinct types of contagion. The most often analyzed
type, financial contagion refers to the spread of financial crises from one country to
one or more other countries. Typically, the spread of crises is marked by a sharp
deterioration of several macroeconomic and financial variables such as a fall in an
index of the stock market, a depreciation of the currency, decreased or negative GDP
growth rates, net outflows of foreign investment, and the collapse of property prices.
Although recent crises such as the East Asian crisis of 1997 have been accompanied
by all of these effects, some of the recent literature has chosen to focus on currency
crises as the signal that a financial crisis has occurred.
It is possible to imagine the contagion of other types of crises as well. One country
may default on its sovereign debt, causing defaults in other countries (default conta-
gion). The stock market in an emerging market might drop significantly followed by
similar drops in other markets independent of a currency crisis (stock market conta-
gion). Political upheavals may destabilize regions promoting turmoil in neighboring
countries (political contagion). A few papers have looked at contagion using these
other indicators of crisis (see, for example, Baig and Goldfajn, 1999).
There is no consensus on what makes up contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2001)
review some of the definitions of what constitutes contagion. Early papers often point
13
to some empirical phenomenon (for example, increased co-movement in short term
interest rates, see Gerlach and Smets 1995) and try to explain it without explicitly
defining contagion. The implicit assumption is that contagion has occurred and the
papers tackle the question of defining its causes.
Testing for contagion of crises requires a definition of crisis. Several papers (see
for example, Glick and Rose, 1999) use popular press accounts to determine the
approximate start of a crisis. These types of tests have the appeal of attempting to
explain the spread of an intuitive (or popular press) notion of crisis. Eichengreen,
Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) point out that focusing only on instances of devaluation
of the exchange rate could miss other significant episodes of market pressure. A
crisis is often preceded by a speculative attack which hastens the devaluation of the
currency. However, the monetary authorities could repel a speculative attack by
raising interest rates. Additionally, the authorities could increase monetary reserves
in non-crisis periods to preempt an attack. To account for these additional periods,
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz devised an index of exchange market pressure (EMP)
that incorporates the key tools that a monetary authority has at its disposal. Using
the EMP index as a proxy for the incidence of a crisis, they estimate a binary probit
model to test for the significance of various macroeconomic variables in explaining
contagion.
2.2 Measuring Contagion
Rigobon (2001) explores a number of pitfalls in commonly used tests for contagion.
Tests for contagion must account for simultaneous equations, omitted variables, and
heteroskedasticity in the data. He specifically looks at the more widely adopted tests
of contagion including linear regressions, logit-probit regressions, and tests based on
Principal Components. He develops procedures to correct for these problems under
special conditions. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) review the four different approaches
that have been used to test for contagion: analysis of correlation coefficients, GARCH
frameworks, cointegration, and probit models.
14
2.3 Mechanisms of Transmission
The literature on contagion has divided explanations for the transmission of financial
crises into two types: fundamental links among economies and the behavior of in-
vestors (Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens 2001). The fundamental links often cited as
conduits of crises are trade and capital flows. Others point to rational and irrational
investor behavior as another mechanism of crisis transmission.
2.3.1 Fundamental Mechanisms
Forbes (2001) reviewed the recent literature on the role of trade in transmitting crises.
Gerlach and Smets (1995) present empirical evidence on the co-movement of interest
rate spreads in Nordic countries during the 1992 EMS crisis. From this, they go on to
develop a three-country model based on the Flood-Garber speculative attack model.
They derive the time path of the exchange rates and show the dependence of the
exchange rate collapse of one country on the collapse of another country. They build a
story of how the collapse of the exchange rate in country 1 leads to a real appreciation
of the exchange rate of country 2. This leads to a decrease in money demand in
country 2 and an erosion of reserves. A decreased ability to defend the exchange rate
in country 2 eventually leads to collapse. They predict that contagion effects would
be stronger when wage flexibility is low and the degree of trade integration is high
between the two countries relative to the anchor country.
In addition, a number of papers empirically estimate the importance of trade in
transmitting crises. Glick and Rose (1999) attempt to distinguish the importance of
trade and macroeconomic mechanisms in the transmission of crises. They regress the
incidence of crises on an index of trade integration involving bilateral trade data. They
find that trade better explains the spread of crises than macroeconomic similarity.
Forbes (2001) uses bilateral trade data broken down by industry and attempts to
separate the macroeconomic effects of changes of different types of trades. She divides
the implications of changes in trade into three types: a competitiveness effect, where
a depreciation in another country's exchange rate decreases the first country's ability
15
to export similar goods; an income effect, where a depreciation will sharply reduce
exports to that country; and a cheap import effect, where the input prices will be
reduced.
2.3.2 Investor Behavior
In 1998, a crisis in Russia led to a series of financial crises in a number of emerging
markets seemingly unrelated by trade or other fundamentals to Russia. To explain
this, Calvo (1999) develops a model where uninformed investors observe the actions of
informed investors. The uninformed investors face a signal extraction problem where
they are not sure whether the sales of assets by informed investors reflects negative
information or margin calls. The actions of these uninformed investors tend to amplify
movements in the price of emerging market securities even where the markets may not
be linked by trade. In general, the co-movement of financial indicators in emerging
economies may be explained by their dependence on a common set of investors.
The remaining chapters of this thesis present a model of global financial crises
that illustrates the time path of contagion and allows for the analysis of contagion
dynamics.
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Chapter 3
Model
This chapter outlines the framework employed in modeling contagion. It presents the
Markov chain formulation of the problem, the mathematical program for probability
generation, and the mechanism for mapping global relationships.
3.1 Toward a Model of Dynamics
Much of the recent work has focused on presenting and testing the significance of
various linkages between economies (for example, regional similarities, trade, and
common investors). Less emphasis has been placed on explicit modeling of the dy-
namics of the spread of a crisis. The course of a global crisis has large ramifications
for investors, multinational corporations, and the people of the afflicted countries.
When a neighboring country experiences a severe and unexpected financial crisis, it
matters a lot whether your country will be next.
In the absence of a framework to model the dynamics of crises, several key fea-
tures of the behavior of crises are overlooked. For instance, the health of a country
may depend on the health of neighboring countries or on trade partners in complex
ways which are not effectively captured in pairwise estimates. Figure 3-1 illustrates,
through a two period example, how a crisis may spread from Country A to Country
C through an intermediate Country B that is related to both A and B.
Figure 3-2 illustrates another phenomenon in which a crisis spreads from Coun-
17
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Figure 3-1: Contagion from Country A to Country C through Country B
try A to Country B. Neither a crisis in Country A nor the crisis in Country B are
individually sufficient to cause a crisis are sufficient to cause a crisis in Country C
but in the second period they together produce a combined effect that is sufficient to
produce a crisis in Country C.
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Figure 3-2: Contagion as a result of combined influence of two countries
Such effects are not sufficiently accounted for in the current schemes that attemp
to model contagion. The comprehensive understanding of contagion of crises calls
for the exploration of a dynamic model of crises dynamics and a broader model of
inter-country dependencies.
3.2 Markov Chain Analysis
3.2.1 Markov Chains
Markov Chains are used to model stochastic processes. The dynamics of a financial
crisis can be modeled using a Markov chain in which the Markov state changes at
specific discrete time steps. At any time t, the current state is denoted by Xt. S
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is the set of possible states.1 The Markov chain is described by a set of transition
probabilities pij that denote the probability that the next state is equal to j given
that the current state is i. Explicitly,
pi3 = P(Xt+1 = jIXt = i) i,j E S. (3.1)
The key assumption underlying a Markov chain is that the transition probabilities pij
apply whenever state i is visited with no dependence on the history of states visited
in the past.
A Markov chain model specifies: (a) the set of states S = 1, ..., n, (b) the numerical
values of the transition probabilities from any one state to any other, pij.
3.2.2 States in Crisis Modeling
Each country is assumed to be in one of two states: tranquil or crisis. A state of the
world then, is defined as any combination of the states of its constituent countries.
Figure 3-3 illustrates the Markov states for a two country case. The dark circles
represent countries in crisis and the empty circles represent countries that are tranquil.
List of states
State 2 Stae 3
B in crisis A in crisis
0 0 00
A B A B
State 4
Both in crisis
0@
A B
Figure 3-3: Markov States for Two Country Case
Figure 3-4 represents the Markov Chain for the two country case. Each circle rep-
resents one state of the world. The arcs between circles represent the transitions from
'For a general treatment of Markov chains see Drake (1967).
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State I
No crisis
0 0
A B
one state to another. Each of these arcs is associated with a transition probability of
going from originating state to the terminating state.
1
00
C2 3
00 @
4
00
Figure 3-4: Two Country Markov Chain
3.3 Mapping Global Relationships
The next stage in modeling contagion involves mapping the dependencies between the
countries under study. The dependencies are proxies for the channels through which
crises spread from one country to another. The relationships between countries can
be modeled as illustrated in figure 3-5 below. The world is represented as a directed
graph in which each country is a node. Arcs represent relationships or dependencies
between countries such that the thickness of each arc reflects the strength of the
relationship or the magnitude of the dependency. A self loop represents a country's
dependence on itself.
The model uses empirical data about countries to generate the Global Relationship
Graph. The graph is represented in the model as a relationship matrix, R. This is
an n x n matrix such that Rab is a non-negative number which shows the dependence
20
CAN
USA
1R
BRA
MEX
PRA
Figure 3-5: Global Relationship Graph for 9 countries: Canada, USA, Brazil, Italy,
China, Fance, Mexico, United Kingdom, Germany
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of country a on country b.
3.4 Generating Transition Probabilities
The final phase in modeling deals with generating transition probabilities between
states in such a manner that the dependencies between countries are mapped appro-
priately into the probability space. That is to say, if a country A is in crisis in state
Si and country B has a high dependence on country A (as given in the relationship
graph), then transitions to states in which country B is in crisis will have higher
probability than states in which country B is not in crisis.
To generate a set of transition probabilities that satisfy the constraints of this
system and preserve the relationship ordering a mathematical program is used. This
model takes two inputs:
Global Relationship Graph: This is represented by the matrix, R, described above
and represents beliefs about the contagion mechanism. Various channels of contagion
can be used to generate this matrix.
[Unconditional Crisis Probabilites: The unconditional crisis for any country k is
represented as 7k and is the probability of the country being in crisis in the absence
of contagion effects. An empirical estimate based on historical occurrences of crises
is used for rk .
The output of the model is a matrix of transition probabilities for the Markov
Chain formulation of the states of the world. The model is shown below.
Notation
Variables Description
Ak Country k
n Number of countries A1 through A,
S Set of all possible states S1 through S2.
pij Probability of transition from Si to Sj
AC Event that country A is in crisis
22
A"' Event that country A is not in crisis i.e. is tranquil
Ij. Indicator variable
= 1 if Ak is in crisis in state Si
= 0 otherwise
'rk unconditional crisis probability of Ak
Dki Dependence of country k on state i
As shown above, the program requires the matrix D such that Dki is the depen-
dence of country k on state i. In order to transform the relationship matrix into this
state dependence matrix we perform the following calculation:
RabR' b R= (3.2)
Sb=1 Rab
n
Dki= I 'R' (3.3)
p= 1
Intuitively, if each country is thought to have one unit of relationship to invest, then
Dki represents the amount of country k's relationship invested in crisis. The first
step corresponds to normalizing each country's relationships to one unit. The second
computes the amount invested in crisis.
Optimization Program
The objective function is chosen so as to make the unconditional crisis probabilities
for each country predicted by the model as close as possible to the unconditional
probabilities provided as inputs to the model. This ensures that the probabilities
generated are consistent with empirically observed historical probabilities.
Minimize:
(P( AC) - Pik)2 (3.4)
k=1
The program then specifies a set of Constraints to ensure that the probabilites
generated are in accordance with probability laws and reflect beliefs about the trans-
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mission of crises. The first constraint sets the bounds on the program variables pij.
The [0,1] interval is mandated by the fact that they are probabilities.
0 P iPj 1 (3.5)
The next constraint is the total probability constraint stating that the sum of all
outgoing probabilities from any Markov state should be one.
2"
Epi = 1 Vi E 1..2n (3.6)
j=1
The next two constraints enforce the contagion effect. They ensure that the
ordering of the countries in terms of the relative strength of their relationships is
preserved.
(P(ACISj) - P(ACISj))(Dki - DkJ) 0 Vk E 1..n,Vij E 1..2n (3.7)
The first contagion constraint, shown above, preserves the ordering of crisis prob-
abilities for one country starting from two different initial states. It ensures that if
more of country k's relationships are invested in crisis in state Si than in Sj then it
is more likely to go to crisis starting from the state Si than from Sj. This constraint
ensures that the relationship ordering is preserved in the probabilities generated.
(P(ACISi) - P(ACISi))(Dki - D%) > 0 Vk, 1 E 1..n, Vi E 1..2n (3.8)
The second contagion constraint preserves the ordering of crisis probabilities of
two countries starting from the same initial state. It ensures that if country k has
more of its relationships invested in crisis in state Si than country 1 then it is more
likely to go to crisis than country 1 if the world is initially in state Si.
The probabilities used in the constraints above are related by the following equa-
tions, which are intermediate calculations to compute the value of P(AC) from the
model variable pij.
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P(AC) = P(S)P(AfjSj) Vk E 1..n (3.9)
i=1
n
P(S) =f [Ikk + (1 - Iki)(1 - irk)] Vi E 1..2n (3.10)
k=1
P(ACISi) = E Ipij Vk e 1..n, Vi E 1..2" (3.11)
jES
3.5 Analysis
The design goals against which the model should be assessed are:
" Feasibility
" Computational tractability
e Optimality
The model's effectiveness can be gauged by it's ability to generate the desired
state transition probabilities, and it's ability to reflect beliefs about the contagion
mechanism in the probabilities generated. The analysis below demonstrates the exis-
tence of a feasible solution for any instance of the model. To show that beliefs about
contagion are adequately represented by the model, a simple theoretical instance of
the model is solved analytically and intuitively.
3.5.1 Feasibility: Initial Feasible Solution
The model guarantees a feasible solution for any instance i.e. starting with any vector
of unconditional default probabilities, ir, and non-negative relationship matrix, R.
Solution:
Choosing
P(ACjSi) = Dki (3.12)
We get:
n
ij= H[Ik1P(A~ISj) + (1 - Iki)(1 - F(ACISi))] (3.13)
k=1
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Each Dki term is between 0 and 1 by construction (equations 3.2, 3.3). Since each
of the terms in the product term defining pij is between 0 and 1, therefore the product
must also be between 0 and 1. Hence constraint (3.5) is satisfied.
EjPij = Z3 H2=1 [I P(AjSj) + (1 - I )(1 - P(A |Si))]
= Ej H2= 1 [IDk i + (1 - I )(l - Dki)]
= 1
Intuitively, the above sum is 1 because it is equivalent to the sum of probabilities over
all outcomes of an experiment in which k coins are tossed such that the probability
that coin k will come up with heads is Dki. Hence the total probability constraint is
satisfied.
The contagion constraints are also satisfied as shown below.
(P(ACISi) - P(Ai|Sj))(Dka - Dkj) = (Dk, - Dk1 )(Dka - Dk3 )
= (Dki - Dk )2
> 0
(P(ACISi) - P(Af|Sj))(Dka - Di ) = (Dka - Di )(Ds - Di )
= (Dki - Di )2
> 0
3.5.2 Optimality: Sanity Check
As a sanity check for the methodology, the model is compared against a scenario
in which the expected solution is known or can be derived analytically. One such
scenario is when each country is only dependent on itself. The matrix R is a diagonal
matrix for instance the identity matrix, I. In this case, intuition suggests that in the
optimal solution the state transition matrix should also be the identity matrix i.e.
in the Markov chain, the self loops for each state have probability 1 and all other
arcs have probability 0. Indeed, running the model on a diagonal matrix yields the
identity matrix as the state transition matrix.
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3.5.3 Tractability: Algorithmic Complexity, Runtime
The optimization formulated above is a quadratic programming problem. All the
constraints are linear in the program variables and the objective is quadratic. The
problem is solvable in polynomial time in the number of variables. However the
number of variables is exponential in the number of countries. The current imple-
mentation ran the problem on a 4 processor (Pentium III, 900 MHz) machine with 4
Gigabytes of memory for upto 8 countries. The program (using AMPL and LOQO)
took about 3 hours to run.
3.6 Conditional Probability of a Crisis
If we are interested in the probability that a particular country develops a crisis
within some time horizon, we can calculate the probability directly from the transition
probability matrix. Let J represent the set of states where the country of interest
is in crisis. In the two country example, country A is in crisis in state 3 and state
4. Then starting from state i, the probability that country A will be in crisis for the
first time at time n, denoted fi, is:
ff = 0,
f= P{X = J, Xk # p, k = 1,...,n- 1,p C JIXo = i}, (3.14)
jEJ
where i is an element of S. The probability of country A being in crisis within the
next year starting from state i (where the time step in one month) is:
12
c =2 fi. (3.15)
n=1
In order too calculate fi, form the reduced transition probability matrix, P, by
dropping the columns and rows corresponding to states in J. Let I be the set of
these remaining states (i.e. I = S \ J with J = {S3, S4}). In the two country
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example,
P11 P12 (3.16)
P21 P22_
We have dropped the columns and rows corresponding to states 3 and 4. The first
transition probability becomes:
f= p'I Pn-2  , (3.17)
jEJ
where pi, and prj are vectors. The matrix P is raised to the power n - 2 because
we are considering the probability of paths that enter the states represented by the
reduced matrix on its first step, remain there for the next n - 2 steps, and enter one
of the states in J on the final step.
28
Chapter 4
Model Instantiation
A particular instance of the model requires a choice of the relationship matrix, R,
and a choice of the unconditional crisis probabilities for each country, 7r. Together
the choices represent beliefs about the world and the optimization program outputs
will effectively model any system of such beliefs. The analysis presented here uses
bilateral trade between countries as a proxy for the relationship matrix and computes
the unconditional probabilities of crisis on the basis of historical values of Exchange
Market Pressure.
4.0.1 Relationship Matrix: Bilateral Trade
The bilateral trade between any two countries is used to calculate the strength of the
relationship i.e. the thickness of the arc. For the trade metric, R is defined as follows:
Rab = trade flow between country a and country b, when a # b
Rab = GDPa - EXPORTSa, when a = b
The trade flow is calculated as the sum of the exports and imports between the
two countries.
4.0.2 Unconditional Crisis Probabilities
Currently the unconditional crisis probabilities are estimated using a historial measure
of Exchange Market Pressure with a crisis threshold. Two methods of estimating the
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probabilities are employed. The first uses a simple average of historical data and the
second uses extremal value theory.
Exchange Market Pressure
The exchange market pressure index introduced by Eichengreen, Wyplosz, and Rose
(1996) captures the notion of a currency crisis in a measure that can then be used to
test for the explanatory power of macroeconomic variables. The EMP index incor-
porates the three elements that are impacted by a speculative attack: the exchange
rate, short-term interest rates, and central bank reserves. This chapter follows the
version of the EMP used by Forbes (2001),
EMPk,t = C1%Aek,t + i3 [(ik,t - iut) - (ik,y - iU,yh) - y(%Arkt - %Arut) (4.1)
where: ek,t denotes the price of U.S. dollars in country k's currency at time t; ik,t is
country k's interest rate; iUt is the U.S. interest rate; ik,y is country k's interest rate
calculated as a rolling average for the previous year starting at time t - 1, iuy,, is the
U.S. interest rate calculated as a rolling average for the previous year starting at time
t - 1; rk,t is the ratio of country k's international reserves to narrow money (Ml); rut
is the ratio of international reserves to narrow money (MI) in the U.S. The weights
a, , and -y are set to the inverse of the standard deviation for each series to equalize
conditional volatilities. %A is measured as the weekly percentage log difference, for
example,
%Aek,t = 100(ln ek,t - In ek,t_1)
To identify periods of crisis, a critical value of EMP for each is determined us-
ing the mean and standard deviation of all EMP observations for that country. In
particular, if
EMPk,t > /EMPk ± + 3 EMPk, (4.2)
then country k is designated to be in crisis at time t, where pLEMPk is the mean of the
EMP series for the country, and UEMPk is the standard deviation of the EMP series
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for the country.
Extremal Value Theory
The probability of a crisis in a country can be obtained by dividing the number of
crisis weeks by the total number of EMP observations. However, for countries that do
not experience a crisis during the sample period, this value would be zero and imply
that a crisis is impossible in these countries. Alternatively, to estimate the probability
of crisis events, assume that the EMP of each country is a random variable with the
right tail distributed according to the following extreme value distribution1
F(Xk) = 1 - DkX', Xk > 0, (4.3)
where Xk take on the EMP values of country k; ak is a parameter greater than zero
to be estimated. We assume that Dk = U 4 k and that nk is equal to the sample mean
plus one sample standard deviation,
1 n n En_1 X - (En_1 X )2
n j n(n - 1)
The cutoff, Uk, is chosen so that the density function is convex and thus better
approximated by the extreme value distribution. Only EMP values for country k
that are greater than the cutoff, Uk, are used to estimate the distribution. Hill's
maximum likelihood estimator of ak is (Embrechts, Kliippelberg, and Mikosch, 1997)
)-a= nU~ (4.5)
where the t values of Xj,k are greater than the cutoff, Uk. Estimate ak for each country
separately. Let C be the value of the crisis cutoff. Then the estimated probability of
'See Embrechts, Klippelberg, and Mikosch (1997), pages 330-331.
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a crisis for country k is
t U dkO -ak.(4.6)
Pk(Xk > = 1 - Fk(C) = -Uik~
where n is the number of observations in the EMP series.
When the historical measurement of crisis probabilities gives a non-zero value
then that is used, otherwise extremal value calculations are used to estimate the
crisis probabilities for the model.
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Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Data
The information needed to calculate the bilateral trade matrix includes bilateral im-
port and export data between various pairs of countries. Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS) provided by the IMF were used for this purpose. The data was located online
at http://econ.bc.edu (restricted access website).
In order to calculate (Exchange Market Pressure) EMP values, we need data for
the following:
" Foreign exchange rates to the dollar,
* Interest Rates,
" International Reserves
* Money Supply
In general, this data was collected from the International Financial Statistics
Database available on CD-ROM. The time series ran monthly from January 1988
until December 2002. The detailed methodology is described below.
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5.1.1 Trade Data
DOTS data was gathered for 44 countries including: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Is-
rael, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia (after 1996), Singapore, Slo-
vak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the U.K., and
Venezuela.
Data was collected between all sets of pairs of these countries (for instance Argentina-
Australia, Argentina-Austria, Argentina-Belgium) for both imports and exports. The
online data for imports was split into 2 groups: C.I.F. and F.O.B. 1 Data collected
was from 1990-2002 and was sorted on a monthly basis.
GDP figures were used from the World Banks World Development Indicators
database. For any given sample, the GDP figures from the year previous to the crisis
year were used.
5.1.2 EMP Data
For the foreign exchange rates, IFS line "rf" was used in comparison to the US
Dollar. This produces the average exchange rates on a monthly basis. Interest rates
were taken from IFS line "60b". For countries where line "60b" did not produce a
complete set of available data, then line "60" was used as a substitute. These interest
rates produced end-of-month rates. Line 60b represents the money market rate and
line 60 is the discount rate. An exception to this is Russia, where interest rates
were available on Global Financial Database. Also note that before 1995, Russian
interest rates were interpolated from quarterly numbers to get them in per month
terms. International Reserves were found on IFS line "1L". These were end-of-month
data. Money Supply was found on IFS line "34". These were also end-of-month data.
An exception to this was the United Kingdom money supply, which was found on
'For more information about this online data source, please consult: http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-
p/data/DOTS.econ.html
34
datastream under the "MO" category.
5.2 Sample Results
For empirical tests of the model six cases which correspond to historical crises were
considered. The data was analyzed for these cases for groups of up to 8 countries
each. The tables below show the model inputs calculated for each case. In each
case data five years before the crisis month was used to construct the historical EMP
values. The trade matrix was constructed using the preceding year's figures, as this
was assumed to be the most accurate snapshot of the trade relationships before the
crisis. The countries included and the time frame for each of the six cases are outlined
below.
Case 1: Mexico Crisis, 1994 Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,
United Kingdom, Venezuela
Case 2: Asia Crisis, 1997 Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, United Kingodom
Case 3: Russia Crisis, 1998 Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Poland, Slovak Re-
public, United Kingdom, Russia, Czech Republic
Case 4: Brazil Crisis, 1999 Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Thailand, United Kingdom
Case 5: Argentina Crisis, 2002 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Russia,
United Kingdom, Venezuela
Case 6: Turkey Crisis, 2001 Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Russia, Turkey
The countries in each case were chosen so as to include major trading partners,
countries to which crises spread and large countries as controls. 7rh indicates historical
crisis probabilities estimated from the data and r,, indicates probabilities shows the
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Table 5.1: Sample Data for Case 1
S.No. Country GDP ($ Mill) I Exports ($ Mill) I 7h ],
1 Argentina 250943 4789 0.042 0.042
2 Brazil 638012 7819 0.021 0.021
3 Canada 538331 4220 0.000 0.009
4 Ecuador 16803 386 0.021 0.021
5 Mexico 292078 2747 0.021 0.021
6 Peru 43788 1027 0.021 0.021
7 United Kingdom 1050118 5155 0.000 0.018
8 Venezuela 76224 1785 0.000 0.009
Table 5.2: Sample Trade Data for Case 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 7941 206 158 534 313 578 257
2 8164 0 1419 282 1405 554 2059 888
3 387 1465 0 162 4154 136 6216 740
4 121 234 69 0 227 209 85 168
5 607 1702 3230 207 0 342 1037 501
6 323 567 213 239 309 0 481 246
7 610 2215 5810 135 968 243 0 508
8 226 829 505 164 451 179 644 0
addition of crisis probabilities using the extremal value methodology for countries
which showed 0 probability of crisis. The trade data is in millions of US dollars.
A sampling of the output of transition probabilites from the model is shown in
the tables below. The contagion effects can be seen in the marked increase in crisis
probabilities following a crisis in another country in the sample. The effect of the
trade relationship can be seen in the relative magnitude of the crisis probabilities of
two countries that are being affected by the country currently in crisis. In each case
only two countries have been chosen for the purpose of illustration. For all but the
Mexico crisis, the increase in probabilities and the ordering of probabilities between
countries is consistent with expectations and in line with historical observations. In
the case of the Mexico crisis, it is evident that trade is not an adequate channel for
explaining the contagion mechanism. Figure 5-1 shows the crisis probabilities over
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Table 5.3: Sample Data for Case 2
S.No. I Country GDP ($ Mill) I Exports ($ Mill) Ji, 177
1 Indonesia 186475 25694 0.021 0.021
2 Japan 5209962 108154 0.000 0.005
3 Korea 449192 37294 0.000 0.004
4 Malaysia 80882 36211 0.000 0.011
5 Philippines 70807 9047 0.000 0.005
6 Singapore 77243 47330 0.000 0.004
7 Thailand 153953 22732 0.000 0.012
8 United Kingdom 1096181 17624 0.000 0.001
Table 5.4: Sample Trade Data for Case 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 20737 5784 2263 921 8879 1715 2323
2 24795 0 40702 25896 13708 26138 24184 21183
3 7640 42607 0 7631 3306 8190 3523 7340
4 2689 27352 6590 0 2056 26303 5962 4670
5 987 12150 2731 1657 0 3908 1721 1796
6 0 32132 7832 41834 4932 0 12600 7890
7 2261 24898 3264 5502 1247 9553 0 3351
8 2821 22291 5654 5343 2228 7691 3398 0
time for Malaysia and Philippines. This is the probability that the country will go
into crisis for the first time in the given period from the initial state. As can be seen
from figure 5-1, the initial probability magnitude is closely tied to the difference in
trade values, but subsequently the network effects in spreading the crisis dominate
and both crisis probabilities converge.
5.3 Conclusion
The results of the analysis show that the model adequately replicates empirically
observed crises in the data. It offers a general paradigm to model the dynamics of
financial crises and is able to capture non-linearities in the spread of crises.
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Malaysia
Philippines
3 4 1 1 7 1 9 ~I
Figure 5-1: Probability of First Going to Crisis Over Time
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Table 5.5: Sample Data for Case 3
S.No. Country GDP ($ Mill) Exports ($ Mill) I 7 
__x___
1 Czech Republic 52036 5980 0.000 0.014
2 Indonesia 202132 6883 0.021 0.021
3 Malaysia 88832 8953 0.021 0.021
4 Poland 127085 4138 0.021 0.007
5 Russia 337709 8562 0.021 0.021
6 Slovak Republic 18377 3202 0.000 0.002
7 Thailand 168280 6381 0.021 0.021
8 United Kingdom 1126740 8985 0.000 0.006
Table 5.6: Sample Trade Data for Case 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 64 161 2560 2389 5093 84 2112
2 22 0 1985 117 155 10 1784 2063
3 34 2486 0 77 213 7 4576 3930
4 2485 212 216 0 3970 927 176 3403
5 1901 102 237 3205 0 1561 93 4132
6 4822 36 33 994 1702 0 24 459
7 0 1883 3978 123 104 0 0 2833
8 2173 2233 4435 3136 3975 298 2853 0
Table 5.7: Sample Data for Case 4
S.No. Country GDP ($ Mill) - Exports ($ Mill) 7h 
____x _
1 Argentina 305712 6824 0.000 0.001
2 Brazil 748180 9106 0.000 0.000
3 Indonesia 197903 7767 0.021 0.021
4 Korea 511767 19493 0.021 0.021
5 Malaysia 97156 11505 0.021 0.021
6 Mexico 337454 1700 0.021 0.021
7 Thailand 156692 7490 0.021 0.030
8 United Kingdom 1227671 7458 0.000 0.008
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Table 5.8: Sample Trade Data for Case 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 11229 169 752 401 772 303 806
2 11758 0 357 1748 515 1747 326 2781
3 168 494 0 4650 1942 204 1746 1687
4 602 2119 6526 0 6803 2309 2803 6875
5 275 376 2988 5902 0 353 5225 4652
6 489 1641 372 3414 1135 0 515 1996
7 298 342 2077 2680 4636 436 4 2819
8 796 2827 2329 6247 4835 1604 2931 0
Table 5.9: Sample Data for Case 5
S.No. [ Country GDP ($ Mill) I Exports ($ Mill) [ 7 x
1 Argentina 268 7609 0.042 0.042
2 Brazil 502 9086 0.042 0.042
3 Chile 66 2703 0.021 0.021
4 Mexico 617 2127 0.021 0.021
5 Peru 54 1231 0.042 0.015
6 Russia 309 2458 0.021 0.021
7 United Kingdom 1 3350 0.000 0.003
8 Venezuela 124 1566 0.021 0.003
Table 5.10: Sample Trade Data for Case 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 8880 1993 179 151 621 231 174
2 8842 0 1482 613 125 1582 373 949
3 2158 1518 0 328 219 944 458 62
4 443 1697 979 572 137 0 215 115
5 218 379 551 336 195 228 0 14
6 156 840 59 70 142 90 41 0
7 378 2282 627 300 78 896 196 2891
8 170 837 255 1365 199 572 269 11
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Table 5.11: Sample Data for Case 6
S.No. I Country GDP ($ Mill) Exports ($ Mill) [Wh 7 xir
1 Brazil 788024 4138 0.042 0.042
2 Canada 693149 6468 0.000 0.006
3 Israel 106383 1963 0.021 0.021
4 Japan 5687635 11546 0.000 0.000
5 Morocco 39324 380 0.000 0.001
6 Russia 357322 6171 0.021 0.021
7 Turkey 0 2213 0.000 0.010
Table 5.12: Sample Trade Data for Case 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0 1575 594 5356 296 1613 208
2 1671 0 663 15691 228 441 291
3 514 573 0 1813 1 678 868
4 5018 14316 1767 0 413 4568 891
5 349 254 0 348 0 414 140
6 1108 300 500 3251 180 0 3313
7 321 352 1178 1472 145 3742 0
Table 5.13: Asian Crisis
Inital State: all tranquil Initial State: Thailand crisis
Malaysia 0.007 0.030
Philippines 0.007 0.018
Table 5.14: Russia Crisis
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Inital State: all tranquil Initial State: Russia crisis
Czech Republic 0.009 0.165
Indonesia 0.0075 0.0144
Table 5.15: Turkey Crisis
Inital State: all tranquil Initial State: Turkey crisis
Israel 0.0118 0.0247
Russia 0.0089 0.0304
Table 5.16: Mexico Crisis
Inital State: all tranquil Initial State: Mexico crisis
Brazil 0.0066 0.0244
Canada 0.006 0.0716
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